From: Game theory elucidates how competitive dynamics mediate animal social networks
Symbol | Meaning |
---|---|
\(n\) | Number of individuals of each phenotype (default value: 6) |
\(V\) | Value of the contested resources (range of tested values: 2–20) |
\(c\) | Cost of fighting (range of tested values: 1–15) |
\(a\) | Cost of assessment (range of tested values: 0–10) |
\(\delta\) | Risk of being detected by a predator (range of tested values: 0–1) |
\(d\) | Confusion factor (range of tested values: 0–1) |
f | Fighting ability of individual \(i\) (1-high, 2-intermediate, 3-low) |
\({v}_{i,j}\) | Link between players \(i\) and \(j\) (0-disconnected, 1-connected) |
\({k}_{i}\) | Degree of individual \(i\) (i.e. number of connexions) |
\({m}_{f}\) | Average risk of mortality of individuals whose fighting ability is \(f\) |
\({k}_{i1}\) | Number of connexions of individual \(i\) with strong contestants |
\({k}_{i2}\) | Number of connexions of individual \(i\) with intermediate contestants |
\({k}_{i3}\) | Number of connexions of individual \(i\) with weak contestants |
\({\overline{k} }_{f}\) | Average number of connexions of individuals whose fighting is \(f\) |
\({\overline{k} }_{f1}\) | Average number of connexions of individuals whose fighting is \(f\) with strong contestants |
\({\overline{k} }_{f2}\) | Average number of connexions of individuals whose fighting is \(f\) with intermediate contestants |
\({\overline{k} }_{f3}\) | Average number of connexions of individuals whose fighting is \(f\) with weak contestants |
\({x}_{f}\) | Frequency with which individuals of fighting ability \(f\) use the Hawk tactic |
\({y}_{f}\) | Frequency with which individuals of fighting ability \(f\) use the Dove tactic |
\({z}_{f}\) | Frequency with which individuals of fighting ability \(f\) use the Assessor tactic |
\({W}_{f}\) | Average fitness of individuals of fighting ability \(f\) |
\(\sigma\) | Proportion of resources shared without aggression |